To do so or not? That's the question the world watching the Middle East has been asking in recent weeks. Will the U.S. and Saudi Arabia announce a major defense deal-plus agreement that officials from both countries have been working on since at least mid-2023?
Will you or won't you? That's the question the world watching the Middle East has been asking in recent weeks. Will the U.S. and Saudi Arabia announce a major defense deal-plus agreement that officials from both countries have been working on since at least mid-2023?
Secretary of State Antony Blinken's visit to Riyadh in late April and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan's pending visit have injected a sense of urgency and anticipation into talk of a possible deal. Reports say the Saudis and the Biden administration are ready, but “obstacles remain.” This is a good expression for Israel.
When talks between officials in Washington and Riyadh began, the Biden administration clearly believed a unilateral deal with Saudi Arabia would never have adequate support on Capitol Hill. The Senate's majority Democrats and minority Republicans (who would need to sign a defense deal) are likely to balk at involving the United States in Saudi Arabia's defense. But the White House reasoned that such a deal would likely gain support in Congress if it were to normalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
It was an elegant idea in September 2023, but now it seems half too cute. The price Saudi Arabia is seeking for normalization after seven months of brutal war in Gaza is too high for Israelis, with about two-thirds of Israelis opposed to the idea. On that basis alone, there is no justification for continuing to pursue a normalization agreement for defense agreements.
But officials in Washington, and particularly in Riyadh, would likely want to exclude Israel from the proposed deal anyway. Otherwise, it would inject a trilateral logic into the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship. If U.S.-Egypt relations are any indication, it could strain relations between Washington and Riyadh in a very unfavorable direction.
US President Joe Biden has declared Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to be essentially a person of character, and US members of Congress are demanding that the crown prince be held accountable for alleged human rights violations. It seems like a long time ago.
There will come a time, as officials in Riyadh predicted at the time, that the president will need a Saudi leader. They didn't wait too long. The surge in travel after the coronavirus outbreak and the upward pressure on gas prices caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine have posed unique challenges for the White House. This task required support from Saudi Arabia. The resulting spike in global energy prices threatened the health of the U.S. economy and, in turn, Biden's election prospects, as Americans grappled with and loudly complained about the soaring prices of everything. This forced Biden to send diplomats to Riyadh and ultimately make a personal visit in July 2022, in hopes of persuading Saudi officials to pump more oil. , hoping to reassure refueling Americans and give the president some support for his faltering poll numbers.
And inflation, driven in part by soaring energy prices, and Russia's invasion of Europe occurred against the backdrop of the White House's tough approach toward China. From the beginning of his administration, Biden has made it a priority to outmaneuver the Chinese government around the world. As the most influential Arab state, Saudi Arabia was expected to be a key element of that strategy.
Then there was the threat of Iran. After U.S. officials spent the better part of two years trying to get Iran to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the nuclear deal from which the U.S. government withdrew in 2018 under then-U.S. President Donald Trump, Biden said that seem to have come to the conclusion that they do not want a nuclear deal. new relationships with the United States and its western neighbors in the Persian Gulf;
As a result, the U.S. government has embarked on efforts to strengthen regional security aimed at containing and deterring Iranians, in which Saudi Arabia is expected to play a key role. But in the wake of the nuclear deal and Trump's refusal to respond to Iran's 2019 attack on its territory, Riyadh officials have wised up. As a result, they now want a formal agreement outlining the US commitment to Saudi Arabia's security.
Saudi Arabia remains unpopular on Capitol Hill due to self-inflicted wounds in 2017 and 2018, culminating in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, once a loyal servant of the House of Saud. Considering how far it has come, Israel, which is popular, should have concluded the deal. Sometimes a critic of the Crown Prince. But while the idea may be well designed, trade normalization for defense deals poses significant downside risks to the relationship that U.S. and Saudi officials believe is paramount.
If the U.S. commitment to Saudi Arabia depends on Saudi normalization with Israel, then the quality of those relationships, the Israeli-Saudi relationship, both overt and This is likely to affect Riyadh's bilateral relations. Obvious way.
Egypt is a prime example of how this dynamic develops. Throughout the era of former President Hosni Mubarak, and especially in the later years of his long reign, the trilateral logic of US-Egypt-Israel relations led to devastating political criticism of the Egyptian regime. Mubarak's opponents, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, argued that Washington had made Egypt a second-rate power in the region because of Israel.
In other words, Mubarak and his advisers stood by as Israel twice invaded Lebanon, settled the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and annexed Jerusalem. Failure to do so would jeopardize and even damage relations with Israel. America. As a result, Egypt ended up protesting Israeli provocations, weapons of the weak, at the United Nations and other international forums, rather than directly challenging Israel.
When the existence of smuggling tunnels from Egypt to the Gaza Strip was first discovered around 2007, Israel and its supporters took advantage of it in Washington. Of course they are right to be furious, but Egyptian officials have said in private conversations that the Israeli side did not treat the situation as a bilateral issue, choosing instead to involve Washington and thereby Egypt complained bitterly that it feared Cairo's military aid would be at risk. This also came at a time when members of the US Congress were openly debating whether to cut military aid to Egypt and shift it to other forms of aid. From an Egyptian perspective, the criticism leveled at Egyptians over the smuggling tunnels at a particularly sensitive time takes a bilateral issue between Egypt and Israel, turns it into an issue between Washington and Cairo, and makes it a problem between the US and Egypt. unduly strained the relationship.
Including Israel in efforts to secure a security agreement with Saudi Arabia would only further complicate an already complicated bilateral relationship. I don't think it's worth it. Of course, there are many differences between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Given that they do not share a border, Israeli security concerns are unlikely to undermine the U.S.-Saudi relationship the way they did the U.S.-Egypt relationship.
Still, what if Saudi Arabia's nuanced approach to managing Iran surprises Israelis? Like Egypt, Saudi Arabia relies on U.S. security assistance, and there is a real possibility that problems will arise in the U.S.-Saudi relationship if Israel does not like the way the palace is pursuing its foreign policy.
If the Biden administration wants a defense deal with Saudi Arabia, let's get it done. There should be enough evidence, and the president is a skilled politician to win over skeptics.